## **Exec-SearchPath-01**

Path-searching Exec functions are susceptible to malicious programs inserted into the search path

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## Part "Original Cigital Coding Rule in XML"

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Attack Category	<ul><li>Path spoofing or confusion problem</li><li>Malicious Input</li></ul>	
Vulnerability Category	<ul><li>Indeterminate File/Path</li><li>Process management</li></ul>	
Software Context	Process Management	
Location		
Description	Path-searching Exec functions are susceptible to malicious programs inserted into the search path.	
	The APIs execlp, execvp, popen, and system are usually implemented through a shell or exhibit shell-like characteristics. If user input can affect the arguments to the function a malicious user could change or add commands to be run.  These functions search the path if a full path to the program is not specified. When using these functions always specify the full path to the program. The Windows _exec and system family of functions is also vulnerable in the same manner. Also be sure to include the file extension (.exe, .com, .bat) to prevent unwanted matches.	
APIs	Function Name Comments	
	_execl	
	_execle	
	_execlp	
	_execlpe	
	_execipe	

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<sup>1.</sup> http://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi-rules/35-BSI.html (Barnum, Sean)

_spawnl	
_spawnle	
_spawnlp	
_spawnlpe	
_spawnv	
_spawnve	
_spawnvp	
_spawnvpe	
_texecl	
_texecle	
_texeclp	
_texeclpe	
_texecv	
_texecve	
_texecvp	
_texecvpe	
_tspawnl	
_tspawnle	
_tspawnlp	
_tspawnlpe	
_tspawnv	
_tspawnve	
_tspawnvp	
_tspawnvpe	
_wexecl	
_wexecle	
_wexeclp	
_wexeclpe	

	_wexecv
	_wexecve
	_wexecvp
	_wexecvpe
	_wspawnl
	_wspawnle
	_wspawnlp
	_wspawnlp
	_wspawnlpe
	_wspawnv
	_wspawnve
	_wspawnvp
	_wspawnvpe
	_wsystem
	execlp
	exect
	execvp
	popen
	system
Method of Attack	These functions will search the path for the first match to the specified program and are thus susceptible to path spoofing attacks. Additionally, on Windows platforms, these functions will execute a .com program before a .exe program unless the file extension is fully specified. This could allow ar attacker to place a malicious .com program in the same location as a similar .exe program.
Exception Criteria	
Solutions	Solution Solution Solution Applicability Description Efficacy
	When any type of path-searching Exec function is used.  When using these functions always specify the full path to the program.

Signature Details  Examples of Incorrect Code  Examples of Corrected Code  Source References	platforms to prevent unwanted searches.  Any of the indicated APIs, with a non-absolute pat or (on Windows) no explicit file extension.  system("MyProgram");  system("/usr/local/bin/ MyProgram");  • Viega, John & McGraw, Gary. Building Secun Software: How to Avoid Security Problems the Right Way. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley Professional, 2001, ISBN: 020172152X, pg. 322  • man pages for execlp, execvp, popen, and
	<ul> <li>Microsoft Developer Network Library</li> </ul>
Recommended Resource	
Discriminant Set	Operating Systems  • Windows (All) • UNIX (All)

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